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Abstract
The textbook treatment for the valuation of warrants takes as a state variable the
value of the firm and shows that the value of a warrant is equal to the value of a call option
on the equity of the firm multiplied by a dilution factor. This approach however applies
only for the not so realistic case where the firm issues only a single warrant. By a single
warrant we mean n warrants with a single exercise price and time to maturity. What
happens however in the “real world” where corporations issue multiple warrants and
executive stock options? What happens for example when firms issue warrants of different
exercise prices, different maturities and different dilution factors? Valuing each type of
warrants independently of the others is clearly inappropriate and will result in mispricing.
In this paper we derive distribution-free (and distribution-specific) formulae for firms that
issue warrants with different maturities, different strike prices, and different dilution
factors and for firms that issue warrants of  the same maturity but different strike prices
(and different dilution factors). The distinction we make between warrants and executive
stock options is simply a matter of whether the contract is traded or not. We use the term
warrant to cover both cases.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Warrants, executive/employee stock options, and exchange traded call options are
all examples of contingent claims. Conceptually they are all rather similar instruments.
They do after all provide the holder with a call option on the underlying.1 However despite
their superficial similarity, warrants and executive options differ in a number of important
ways from vanilla exchange traded options. These differences, initially between warrants
and standard call options and in the very recent years between executive stock options
(ESOs) and exchange traded options, have inspired a great deal of academic and practical
interest that has spanned the subject not only from a purely “asset pricing/valuation”
perspective or from a purely “corporate finance/agency theory” perspective but has also
resulted in an amalgamation of the two in the sense that valuation of warrants and ESOs
has occasionally not been free of considerations such as corporate policies, managerial
incentives, stockholders attitudes etc. Furthermore, as interest and more importantly
issuance of these corporate instruments, particularly ESOs, has surged over the years, and
all this amidst widespread demand for more financial transparency in corporate accounts,
assessing correctly their true cost/value to stockholders/stakeholders has never been more
imperative. We first briefly outline a few, from a long list of features, that distinguish
warrants and ESOs from standard exchange traded options and can potentially complicate
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1
 According to Hull (2000): Warrants are call options that often come into existence as a result of a bond
issuance. They are added to the bond issue to make it more attractive to investors. Typically, a warrant lasts
for a number of years. Once they have been created, they sometimes trade separately from the bonds to
which they were originally attached. Executive stock options are call options issued to executives to motivate
them to act in the best interests of the company’s shareholders. They are usually at-the-money when they are
first issued. After a period of time they become vested and can be exercised. Unlike warrants and exchange-
traded stock options they cannot be sold. They often last as long as 10 or 15 years.
2their valuation. We then concentrate in one particular feature, namely the capital structure
or dilution effect of warrants and ESOs, which provides the benchmark for this paper.
To start with, warrants often contain special provisions that allow the issuing
company the right to call the warrants; see Schultz (1993), as well as the possibility to alter
their maturity and/or exercise price; see Longstaff (1990), Howe and Wei (1993). The
same also applies to ESOs where resetting the terms of already issued options that have
gone “underwater” (i.e. (deep)-out-of-the-money) is a common phenomenon amongst
young, developing corporations. This usually involves specifying a new strike price which
at the time of resetting is often set equal to the current stock price. Extending the maturity
of the options or canceling an executive's existing options and granting him or her new
options with a lower strike price, although not as frequent, are also in the agenda. Among
others, Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000), Carter and Lynch (2001) examine the
“repricing” of ESOs and allocate it to poor firm-specific performance. The empirical
evidence in Chance, Kumar, and Todd (2000) suggest that ESOs are usually repriced when
the stock declines by about 25%. Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) investigate the
optimality of resetting ESOs and find that a corporate policy that allows/accommodates for
some resetting is almost always optimal. The default in this study will be that all the
aforementioned special features, which we hereby refer to as special exercise provisions,
are exogenous. However, if required, it is also possible to endogenize them in the
valuation. Brenner, Sundaram and Yermack (2000) note for example that an ESO that will
be repriced, i.e. whose strike price will change to a lower strike price the first time the
stock price falls below a pre-specified barrier, can be valued as a portfolio of a down-and-
out call with the initial strike price and a down-and-in call with the new lower strike price.
Moving on now from the special exercise provisions of the stake-issuers to value
enhancing exercise strategies of the stake-holders, Emanuel (1983), Constantinides (1984),
and Spatt and Sterbenz (1988) have examined exercise strategies by warrant-holders to
increase the value of their warrants (e.g. sequential exercise – early exercise) and the
actions of the warrants-issuers to neutralize this (e.g. reinvestment policies). Along the
same lines, managerial incentives, arising from the issuance of ESOs, to increase the stock
price, increase risk, reduce dividend yield (see Johnson and Tian (2000), Carpenter
(2000)), and incentives in timing the exercises of ESOs; see Carpenter and Remmers
(2001), are also fruitful areas for research. Again, for the purposes of this paper, we treat
value-enhancing (or sometimes value-reducing) managerial strategies as exogenous
factors.
Turning to maturity issues, both warrants and ESOs have much longer maturities
than exchange traded options (compare for example 3-5 years and 10-15 years respectively
with up to 1 year for standard options). Lauterbach and Schultz (1990) and Rubinstein
(1995) are good references in identifying some of the difficulties associated with applying
standard option models to long-term options. The results presented in this study are
distribution free and thus applicable to a wide range of option pricing models, including
3models such as the Constant Elasticity of Variance (CEV) of Cox and Ross (1976) or
Merton’s (1976) Jump-diffusion, which might be more suitable for valuing long-term
options.
From a financial economics point of view, the theoretically most interesting feature
of warrants and executive stock options as opposed to standard calls is their capital
structure effect on the issuing firm. When warrants and executive options are exercised,
new shares are issued and any exercise proceeds are paid into the firm. As a result, the
interests of the firm's existing shareholders are diluted, including possible dilution in
wealth, voting rights and the underlying stock price. The source of this dilution is the game
that is played between the stakeholders and existing shareholders. A way to deal with the
so-called dilution effect, originally suggested by Black and Scholes (1973), popularized by
Galai and Schneller (1978) and also discussed in Lauterbach and Schultz (1990), Schulz
and Trautmann (1994) is to value warrants as call options on the value of the firm (not the
stock price) multiplied by a dilution factor. This framework has subsequently become the
standard treatment for warrant valuation and appears in almost every textbook on
derivative securities.
Over the past decade, empirical literature on warrant pricing (see for example
Bensoussan, Crouhy, and Galai (1992), Veld (1994), Sidenius (1996)) has suggested that
there is no need to follow the textbook treatment to value warrants  (i.e. the value of the
firm approach). Instead based on their empirical results and simulations these studies
recommend “option-like” warrant valuation. This simply means valuing the warrant as if it
was identical to a call option, without involving in the valuation process the (typically
unobservable) value of the firm and ignoring any dilution. Surprisingly such an
approximation works very well for a large number of cases. Cox and Rubinstein (1985)
and Ingersoll (1987) recognize that when dilution is sufficiently small then it may be
ignored. Schulz and Trautmann (1994) and Darsinos and Satchell (2002) have illustrated
that “option-like” valuation will indeed price “correctly” and efficiently in-the-money,
near-the-money and long maturity out-of-the-money warrants (and ESOs). However, they
also find that for deep-out-of-the-money and near maturity out-of-the-money warrants in
general, this approximation will significantly overprice warrants with the overpricing an
increasing function of the dilution factor2.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the theoretical framework for warrant and
ESO valuation so that it correctly accounts for the dilution effect in the presence of
multiple warrant (or ESO) issuances. Both the existing theoretical framework and the
“option-like” valuation approximation outlined above are only appropriate for the case
when firms issue just a single warrant. By a single warrant we mean n identical
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 Regarding the dilution factor, there appear to be no specific limits placed upon the total number of options
granted. Each bunch of share options to be awarded is put before the shareholders in the general meeting for
their approval. Over time, the total granted can rise to a considerable percentage, often well in excess of 10%
of the issued capital (particularly so for high-tech firms).
4outstanding warrants with a single exercise price and time to maturity. For the more
realistic case where firms issue multiple warrants with different exercise prices and
different maturities, application of the current textbook approach will result in overpricing.
Indeed, the existing framework does not take into account the interdependence between
warrants and the potential dilution effect of each issuance on the remaining warrants. The
formulae derived in this paper incorporate the potential dilution effect of all the
outstanding warrants on each particular issuance thus adjusting downwards the “true”
value/cost of these instruments. Furthermore, just because “option-like” valuation is often
a good approximation technique for the single warrant/ESO case does not a priori imply
(and rightly so) that it will prove useful for approximating the value of multiple warrant
issuances. By deriving the theoretical formulae for the valuation of multiple issuances, we
provide the correct benchmark against which to check the quality of this approximation.
This line of enquiry is particularly useful since corporations in their annual reports,
according to the FASB mandates, often calculate the value/cost of their ESOs using
“option-like” valuation. We believe that an extension of the existing framework is
mandated since rarely in practice do companies issue only a single Executive Stock Option
or warrant. For example, Marquardt (1999) examines 58 Fortune 100 firms over a 21 year
period and finds an average of 17 contracts per firm. Furthermore, a casual glance at the
accounts of any company that grants options to its executives/employees reveals a variety
of maturities and exercise prices.
The distinction we make in this paper between warrants and executive share
options is simply a matter of whether the contract is traded or not. Moreover we take the
term executive stock options to contain the popular subset of employee share option
schemes which have been successfully introduced amongst corporations during the past
few years. Generally, we shall use the term warrant to cover all cases (i.e. warrants,
executive options and employee options).3 Issues of non-transferability, delayed vesting
and suboptimal exercise policies of Executive Stock Options (ESOs) are not discussed in
this paper. For these (and a few other) differences between exchange-traded options and
ESOs we refer the reader to Rubinstein (1995). Here it suffices to say that the reduction in
value of an executive option due to the non-transferability constraint is usually handled my
multiplying the value that would otherwise be obtained (i.e. the value of a traded warrant)
by one minus the probability that the executive/employee will leave the firm before
exercise is possible. The default in this study will be that the probability of “premature
leave” is zero (it is straightforward however to modify this assumption).
Regarding now the delayed vesting constraint or exercise policy of ESOs in
general, it is indeed the case that most option plans do not permit employees to exercise
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 It is worth mentioning here that warrants are usually issued deep-out-of-the-money while ESO’s are
typically issued at-the-money (see for example Noreen and Wolfson (1981)). Hall and Murphy (2000)
investigate the economic rationale behind this approach and find that by setting the exercise price at- or near-
the grant-date market price, corporations maximize the incentives of their employees and executives.
5their granted options until after a predefined period of time has elapsed (for example, an
executive option has typically a maturity of 10 years; however through delayed vesting,
exercise is usually not permitted for a period after grant, typically 3 years). In other words
ESOs are neither European nor American. In its Exposure Draft, “Accounting for Stock-
based Compensation,” FASB allows valuing ESO’s as European but requires using the so
called “expected life of the option” instead of the actual time to expiration. Carpenter
(1998) examines the exercise policies of managers which can be executive-specific when
the individual preferences, endowments, hedging and transferability constraints come into
play. She shows that early exercise of an ESO is not consistent with exercise patterns
observed in the data. Executives hold options long enough and deep enough into the
money before exercising to capture a significant amount of their potential value. Detemple
and Sundaresan (1999) find that ESOs may be exercised prematurely even when the
underlying asset pays no dividends. In any case, as indicated by Rubinstein (1995) an ESO
has two values. The one is highly personal depending on the preferences and financial
circumstances of each employee. The other, which is the one that should be used by the
corporation in its external financial statements, is the value of the option according to the
effect its existence has on the value of the underlying stock. This is the notion of value that
we use in this paper. As a final note, ESOs are particularly popular amongst high-tech
firms. Such corporations promise rapid growth but also pay little or no dividends. (see
amongst many others Microsoft Corporation, Oracle, Cisco Systems, AoL Time-Warner,
etc). This has the additional advantage that American-type ESOs can, for the purposes of
valuation, be considered as European.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline the textbook treatment
for warrant valuation. We show that the price of a warrant can be evaluated as a call option
on the equity value of the firm multiplied by a dilution factor equal to )1/(1 λ+ . ( λ
represents the ratio of the total number of new shares issued upon exercise of the warrants
to the total number of existing shares). However we claim that this framework applies only
for firms with a single warrant/ESO issuance, which in practice is rarely the case. In
Section 3 we extend the theoretical framework to accommodate for multiple warrants. In
particular, in section 3.1 we derive pricing formulae for firms that issue warrants of
different maturities, different strike prices (and different dilution factors), while in section
3.2 we provide formulae for firms with warrants of common maturity but different exercise
prices (and different dilution factors). The derived formulae are distribution free and are
thus applicable to a wide range of process assumptions for the state variable. In Section 4
we make the derived formulae operational under the very widely-used assumption of
Geometric Brownian Motion for the value process. Section 5 contains an empirical
illustration where we value the outstanding ESOs of Cisco Systems. We find that
application of the single warrant valuation technique in the multiple setting of Cisco
Systems results in significant overpricing. On the other hand, Black-Scholes “option-like”
valuation results in underpricing. This re-enforces existing concerns on the optimality of
6using standard, unmodified option pricing models to account for the cost of stock-based
compensation. Section 6 concludes.
2. A FRAMEWORK FOR WARRANT PRICING
2.1 The Textbook Treatment for the Valuation of Warrants:
Firms with a Single Warrant Issuance
Valuation of warrants dates as back as the valuation of traded options. In fact,
according to Black (1979), the celebrated option valuation model of Black and Scholes
(1973) was originally developed for the pricing of warrants. However, warrants and
executive stock options are written by companies on their own stock. When they are
exercised, the company issues more shares and sells them to the stakeholders for the strike
price. This subsequently dilutes the equity of existing shareholders. The textbook treatment
for warrant valuation thus mandates that the warrants should be regarded as call options on
a share of the total equity value of the firm, where equity is defined as the sum of the value
of its shares and the value of its warrants.4 We therefore start with the following
simplifying assumption:
ASSUMPTION 1: The warrant-issuing firm is an all equity firm with no outstanding debt.
This then implies that stocks and warrants are the only sources of financing that the
company is using. Hence, at current time t = 0, the company has a total equity value 0V of:
)( 000 SnWNSV +=                                                    (1)
where
 N:  The number of outstanding shares.
0S :  The current price per share.
 n:  The number of outstanding warrants
)( 0SW : The current price of a warrant on a share.
Similarly the value of the firm per share (total equity per share) NVv /00 =  is:
)( 000 SWSv λ+=                                                      (2)
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 Alternatively, valuation of warrants can also be performed by pricing them as call options on the stock price
of the warrant-issuing firm. This of course requires knowledge of the distribution of the stock price of the
warrant-issuing firm, which will be different both from the distribution of the value of the firm and from the
distribution of the stock price of a non-warrant issuing firm (see Darsinos and Satchell (2002) for more
details).
7where Nn /=λ  is the dilution factor. More generally tv , tV , and tS  will be the values of
the above entities at time t.
Suppose now that each warrant entitles the holder to purchase one share of the firm
at time T for a strike price of K per share.5
 CASE 1: The warrants are exercised at maturity.
If the outstanding warrants are exercised at time T, the company receives a cash
inflow of nK and the total equity value increases to nKVT + . This value is then distributed
among N + n shares so that the price per share immediately after exercise becomes
)/()( nNnKVS TT ++=
Hence, if the warrants are exercised, the payoff to each warrant holder is
=)( TSW K
nN
nKVT
−
+
+ )(
1
1)( K
N
V
K
N
V
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−
+
=−
+
= λ
                                        )(
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1 KvT −
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Of course the warrants will be exercised only if KvT > .
 CASE 2 (Trivial): The warrants are not exercised at maturity.
If the warrants are not exercised then no dilution of equity takes place. At maturity
the price per share will be
TT VS =
and the payoff to the warrant holders will be zero
0)( =TSW
The warrants will not be exercised when KvT ≤ .
We have therefore illustrated that the payoff to a warrant holder at maturity will be
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 We assume that each warrant entitles the holder to purchase one share of the firm. It is straightforward to
modify this assumption and assume that each warrant entitles the holder to purchase p numbers of shares. For
simplicity the default in this study will be p = 1.
8+
−
+
= )(
1
1)( KvSW TT λ                                                 (3)
But this is the payoff of )1/(1 λ+  call options on the total equity value of the firm per share
v. Hence the value of a warrant at current time t = 0, )( 0SW , can be obtained as:




−
+
+×−= ∫∫ ∞
∞− K
TRNT
K
TRN vvfKvvvfrSW )\()(1
1)/(0)exp()( 000 λτ                (4)
where )/( 0vvf TRN  is the conditional risk-neutral distribution of the value of the firm per
share. Writing the above in symbolic notation, suppressing any subscripts, we have
),,,,(
1
1)( rKTvCSW vσλ+≡                                              (5)
where )   (C  denotes a call option (pricing function), T is the time to maturity of the
warrant, vσ  and r represent the equity volatility and risk-free rate respectively.6 This then
implies (see also equation (2)) that the following representation for the stock price of a
warrant-issuing firm must hold:
),,,,(
1
rKTvCvS vσλ
λ
+
−=                                              (6)
In other words, the stock price of a warrant/executive option issuing firm is given as a
linear combination of the equity value process and an option on the equity value process.
Theoretically, as first indicated by Galai and Schneller (1978), warrant valuation
can also be performed using the stock price distribution of the warrant-issuing firm.
Symbolically this means valuing warrants as:
),,,,()( rKTSDSW Sσ≡                                                 (7)
where
)   (D  represents a call option valuation function.
Sσ  denotes the stock return volatility.
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 For clarity we note here that when we refer to equity volatility or stock volatility we don’t really mean the
absolute volatility of the equity or the stock but rather the volatility of the rate of return on the equity or stock
respectively.
9Valuing warrants using equation (5) or equation (7) will produce identical results.
The two equations represent after all equivalent approaches to warrant valuation. Note
however that )   (D  is different from )   (C . The two call option pricing functions are
different in the sense that )   (C  is derived based on the process followed by the value of
the firm, while )   (D  depends on the process of the stock price of the warrant-issuing firm.
Darsinos and Satchell (2002) derive the distribution of the stock price of a warrant-issuing
firm and show that it is markedly different from the distribution of the stock price of a non-
warrant issuing firm (particularly so for high to moderate dilution factors). However they
also find that despite of the fact that the risk-neutral distributions of a warrant-issuing firm
and a non-warrant-issuing firm are different, valuation by taking expectations of the
discounted payoff of the warrants over the two different risk-neutral distributions produces
warrant prices very close to each other for a large number of cases even when the log-stock
price distribution of the warrant-issuing firm exhibits marked skewness and kurtosis. The
significance of this result is that for a large number of cases warrants can be valued using
the following “option-like” valuation approximation7:
),,,,()( rKTSCSW Sσ≡                                                 (8)
where
),,,,(
1
1),,,,(),,,,( rKTvCrKTSDrKTSC vSS σλσσ +=≈
Exceptions occur for deep-out-of-the-money and close to maturity out-of-the-money
warrants in general. In such cases, the “option-like” valuation approximation of equation
(8) will overprice warrants, with the pricing error increasing the higher the dilution factor.
In any case, the framework presented thus far applies only for the not so realistic
case where the firm under consideration issues only a single warrant. What happens
however in the “real” world where corporations issue multiple warrants and ESOs? Do the
same formulae apply for firms that issue warrants and ESOs with multiple exercise prices
and maturities? We provide the answer to this question in the following section.
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 To avoid any misunderstanding, we note here that the nature of the so-called “option-like” valuation
approximation is that it takes the distribution of the stock price of a non-warrant-issuing firm as an
approximation to the distribution of the stock price of a warrant-issuing firm. Furthermore to make things
more specific, the pricing function C(   ) is usually taken to be the Black-Scholes model. However if C(   ) is
Black-Scholes, then, in the presence of warrants, D(   ) will not be Black-Scholes. The nature of the
approximation is thus that D(   ) is approximated by the Black-Scholes model.
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3. EXTENDING THE FRAMEWORK FOR WARRANT PRICING:
FIRMS WITH MULTIPLE WARRANTS
Most, if not all companies, issue more than one type of warrants/executive stock
options. By this we mean that companies issue q types (i = 1,2…,q) of warrants  each with
its own exercise price iK  and time to maturity iT . Moreover for each type of warrants
there is a number in  of outstanding warrants. Under such a specification, the company’s
current value of the firm per share is given by:
∑
=
+=
q
i ii
SWSv
1
)(λ                                                     (9)
where
Nnii /=λ  is the dilution factor of each type of warrants.
)(SWi : The price of a type-i warrant on a share at current time t=0.
This then implies the following representation for the stock price of the warrant-
issuing firm:
∑
=
−=
q
i ii
SWvS
1
)(λ                                                    (10)
However this time we cannot write the multiple-warrant case as an analogue of the single
warrant case. In other words the following relationship does not hold:
∑
= +
−=
q
i iVii
i
i rKTvCvS
1
),,,,(
1
σλ
λ
                                      (11)
That is, we cannot price each type of warrants independently of the others as
),,,,(
1
1)( iVii
i
i rKTvCSW σλ+=                                          (12)
for i = 1, 2, …, q. Valuing each type of warrants as a single issuance using equation (12)
will result in overpricing. We need a valuation formula that takes into account the
interdependence between warrants and the potential dilution effect of each issuance on the
value of the other warrants. To simplify exposition we will consider two subcases. In
section 3.1 we first consider the case where the firm issues warrants of different maturities
and different strike prices while in section 3.2 we consider the case where the corporation
issues warrants of common maturity but with multiple exercise prices.
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3.1 Firms with warrants of different maturity and different strike price
To start with, assume for simplicity a firm with two warrants of different maturities
1T  and 2T , and different strike prices 1K  and 2K .8 Without loss of generality take 1T < 2T .
Then the current value of the firm per share is given by:
)()( 02201100 SWSWSv λλ ++=
where Nn /11 =λ  and Nn /22 =λ  are the dilution factors.
 CASE 1: The first-type warrants are exercised at maturity 1T .
If the first-type warrants are exercised at time 1T  the company receives a cash
inflow of 11Kn  and the total equity value increases to 111 KnVT + . This value is then
distributed among N + 1n  shares so that the price per share immediately after exercise
becomes
)/()( 11111 nNKnVS TT ++=
Hence, if the first-type warrants are exercised, the payoff to their holders (at maturity) is:
1
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1
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+
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1)( 1
1
1
1
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K
N
V
nN
N TT
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+
= λ                 (13)
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1
1
1
1
1 KvT −+
= λ
By a similar argument, provided that the first-type warrants have been exercised at
time 1T , we have that if at time 2T  the second-type warrants are exercised the company
will receive another cash inflow of 22 Kn . The price per share immediately after exercise
now becomes:
)/()( 212222 nnNKnVS TT +++=
Hence, if the second-type warrants are exercised, the payoff to the warrant holders is
))(()( 212
21
2
21
22
2
22
2 KN
n
K
N
V
nnN
NK
nnN
KnV
SW TTT +−
++
=−
++
+
=                 (14)
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 Note here that the strike prices can also be the same.
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                                       ))((
1
1
212
21
2
KKvT λλλ +−++=
The payoffs in equations (13) and (14) will be valid, if and only if, the first-type warrants
have been exercised at time 1T . We express the probability that the above payoffs are valid
as )(Pr 11 Kvob T > .
 CASE 2: The first-type warrants are not exercised at time 1T .
Then of course at maturity:
0)( 11 =TSW                                                          (15)
Valuation of the second-type warrants now reduces to valuing a single warrant issuance.
We can therefore show that the payoff of the 2T -maturity warrants will be:
+
−
+
= )(
1
1)( 2
2
2 22 KvSW TT λ                                           (16)
These payoff structures will hold if and only if the first-type warrants have not been
exercised at time 1T . The probability of this happening is naturally 1 - )(Pr 11 Kvob T > .
We can now derive pricing formulae for the two warrants. For the 1T -maturity
warrants this is straightforward. We just have (using equations (13) and (15)) that their
current value is:
dvvvfKvrTSW TRN
K
T )\()(1
1)exp()( 0
1
1
1
101 11∫
∞
−
+
×−= λ
Or in symbolic notation
),,,,(
1
1)( 11
1
01 rKTvCSW vσλ+=                                         (17)
When valuing the 2T -maturity warrants we must take into account the potential dilution
effect of the 1T -maturity warrants. We therefore have (using equations (14) and (16)):
      dvvvfKvrTKvobSW TRN
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Or in symbolic notation:
),,,,(
1
1))(Pr1()( 22
2
102 1 rKTvCKvobSW vT σλ+×>−=                       (18)
              ),,,,(
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1)(Pr 2122
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11 rKKTvCKvob vT σλλλ +++×>+
We also get the following representation for the stock price of our warrant issuing-firm:
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Expressions for the case of q different warrants can also be derived in a similar
manner. In fact the above formulae are valid for a firm with q-types of warrants with
maturities qn TTTTT <<<<<< ......321 . To derive the value of the warrants with maturity
3T  we need to calculate 132 −  probabilities (or more precisely products of probabilities).
The valuation formula for the 3T -maturity warrants will thus consist of 4 terms and is
given by:
=)( 03 SW ),,,,(1
1)(Pr1())(Pr1( 33
3
21 21 rKTvCKvobKvob vTT σλ+×>−×>−
            ),,,,(
1
1)(Pr))(Pr1( 3233
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In general to find the valuation formula for the nT -maturity warrants, for any n , we define
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Then there are 12 −n  possible values of ),...,( 11 −nδδ . Let S be the set of all such values. Also
let
)(Pr iTi Kvobp i >= .
Hence the formula will consist of 12 −n  terms and is given by:
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This is the valuation formula for a firm with warrants of different maturity (and different or
common strike). We make practical use of this formula later, in our empirical application
of section 5 where we value the multiple ESOs of Cisco Systems. We now turn to deriving
the formula for a firm with warrants of common maturity but different strike prices.
3.2. Firms with warrants of common maturity but multiple exercise prices
Again for ease of exposition consider first a firm with 2 warrants with exercise
prices 1K  and 2K , and common time to maturity T. Without loss of generality we assume
that 1K  < 2K .
 CASE 1: Both warrants are exercised at maturity T.
If both warrants are exercised at maturity the company receives a cash inflow of
2211 KnKn +  and the total equity value increases to 2211 KnKnVT ++ . This value is then
distributed among 21 nnN ++   shares so that the price per share immediately after exercise
becomes
21
2211
nnN
KnKnVS TT ++
++
=
Hence if the warrants are exercised the payoff to their holders is:
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Of course both warrants will be exercised if and only if )( 1221 KKKvT −−> λ  and
)( 2112 KKKvT −−> λ . Since we have 1K < 2K , this then implies that both warrants will be
exercised if and only if
)( 2112 KKKvT −−> λ
 CASE 2: Only one warrant is exercised at maturity
If only the warrant with the lowest strike price is exercised then using a similar
procedure as above, we can show that the payoff to the warrant holders is:
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and
0)(2 =TSW                                                         (24)
The warrant with the lowest exercise price will be exercised if and only if 1KvT > .
 CASE 3 (Trivial): None of the warrants are exercised
The final case (which is redundant) is when none of the warrants are exercised.
Then the payoff to their holders is zero. This will be the case if 1KvT ≤ .
We can now derive pricing formulae for the two warrants. Let us first obtain a
valuation formula for )( 01 SW . The first warrant has two different nonzero payoffs
depending on whether one or both warrants are exercised:
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This then implies that
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The calculations required to arrive to equation (26) (from equation (25)) are exhibited in
the Appendix. To obtain a valuation formula for )( 02 SW , we note that the second-type
warrants have a non-negative payoff only when both warrants are exercised. Hence it
follows immediately that:
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It is now straightforward to try and generalize the formulae. For example, for a firm with 3
warrants with exercise prices 1K  < 2K  < 3K  and common time to maturity T, using the
same methodology as above, we get:
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Generally for q-types of warrants with common maturity T and multiple strike prices
qn KKKKK <<<<<< ......321  we have that for any n:
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4. SPECIFYING A PROCESS FOR THE STATE VARIABLE
So far our analysis has been distribution free and the results presented above are
valid for a range of process assumptions for the value of the firm. However to make the
formulae operational we must now specify the law that governs the evolution of v. In other
words, we must assume a process for the state variable v, so that the call option pricing
function )   (C  obtains a specific functional form and can therefore be evaluated. The
literature on warrant pricing has mainly concentrated on three processes for the value of
the firm. Apart from Black and Scholes’s Geometric Brownian Motion which assumes
constant volatility, Cox and Ross’s (1976) Constant Elasticity of Variance (CEV) model
(see Noreen and Wolfson (1981), Lauterbach and Schultz (1990), Schulz and Trautmann
(1989)) and Merton’s (1976) Jump Diffusion model (see Kremer and Roenfeldt (1993))
have also been used to model the value process. The results presented above will be valid
under any specification. Of course the functional form of )   (C  will depend on the
particular process chosen. It is not the aim of this paper to go into a detailed review of the
literature on the most appropriate value process for warrant pricing. An exhaustive study
that reviews the empirical research under alternative stochastic processes has already been
conducted by Veld (1994). Here it suffices to quote one of the conclusions of Veld: “There
is no conclusive evidence to replace (dividend corrected) models in which a constant
volatility is assumed (i.e. Black-Scholes like models) by more complicated models such as
the Jump Diffusion or the CEV model.” For operational convenience and since it is the
absolute standard in the industry we therefore assume hereafter that the value process is a
lognormal diffusion:
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ASSUMPTION 2: The total equity value of the firm per share v is governed by Geometric
Brownian motion:
vdBvdtdv vv σµ +=
where
vµ : The expected rate of return on the value of the firm’s assets
vσ : The standard deviation of the rate on the value of the firm’s assets.
B :  A standard Brownian motion.
Assumption 2 implies that in a risk-neutral world:
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where
0BBZT T −=  ; i.e. Z is a standardized normal variable.
As a byproduct of assumption 2, we can now calculate explicitly, using equation
(32), the probability that )(Pr iT Kvob i > . (Remember that this probability appears in the
pricing equation for multiple warrants with different maturities; i.e. equation (20)). We
therefore have that
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where )   (Φ  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function (remember that
Z is a standard normal random variable). Furthermore the pricing function
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that also appears in equation (20) takes the familiar form
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where )   (BSC  denotes the Black-Scholes option price for a European call.
We have now a fully operational warrant pricing formula and apart from v and vσ
the remaining arguments of the formula can be observed in the market or extracted from
the annual accounts of each firm. However it is also possible to estimate v and vσ  using
observed stock market data for S and Sσ . To do that we just need to solve a system of two
nonlinear simultaneous equations. Remember that from equation (10) we have the
following representation for the stock price of a warrant/ESO issuing firm:
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where we now know that each )(SWi  (i =1,2,...n,…,q)  is evaluated using the formula of
equation (20). It is also well known (see for example Schulz and Trautmann (1994),
Darsinos and Satchell (2002)) that
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Equations (33) and (34) can be solved simultaneously for the two unknown arguments v
and vσ .
Turning now to the formula for q-types of warrants with common maturity T and
multiple strike prices qn KKKKK <<<<<< ......321  we have that under Black-Scholes
assumptions for any n :
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This follows straightforwardly from equation (31). In this case as well the latent
parameters v and vσ  can be estimated using the numerical procedure outlined above where
of course this time we substitute equation (35) for the value of each )(SWi  (i =1,2,...n,…,q)
5. AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
As an empirical application of the theoretical framework presented thus far we now
turn to valuing the Executive Stock Options of Cisco Systems. Cisco Systems is one of the
leading technology companies and has stock options issued to about half its employees
(announced January 2002)9. At July 28, 2001 the company’s ESOs were classified into 5
major categories according to strike and maturity, and their aggregate dilution potential
was approximately 15%. Table 1 exhibits all the relevant information as extracted from the
Company’s 2001 annual report.
TABLE 1
Cisco Systems: Information on Outstanding Executive Stock Options at July 28, 2001
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Number of ESO
Issuances: n =
Maturity
(Years)
Exercise Price per Share
($)
Number Outstanding
(millions)
--------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
1 1T  = 4.45 1K  = 4.97 226    ( 1λ  = 3.1%)
2 2T  = 6.64 2K  = 13.98 255    ( 2λ  = 3.5%)
3 3T  = 7.52 3K  = 37.45 338    ( 3λ  = 4.6%)
4 4T  = 7.54 4K  = 55.85 214    ( 4λ  = 2.9%)
5 5T  = 7.77 5K  = 69.35 27      ( 5λ  = 0.4%)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total  T = 6.66  K = 29.41 1,060 ( %5.14=λ )
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(a) The last row in the table as represented by “Total” is an attempt to treat the multiple ESO issuances as a
single “representative” issuance with maturity and exercise price given by a weighted average of the
individual strikes and maturities respectively. Specifically the single “representative” maturity is given by
T = (226/1060)*4.45+(255/1060)*6.64+(338/1060)*7.52+(214/1060)*7.54+(27/1060)*7.77=6.66
and the single “representative” strike by
K = (226/1060)*4.97+(255/1060)*13.98+(338/1060)*37.45+(214/1060)*55.85+(27/1060)*69.35=29.41.
(b) At July 28, 2001, there were 7,324 million ordinary shares in issue (required to calculate the dilution
factors).
Additional information extracted from stock market data and the firm’s accounts include
that, at July 28, 2001 the share price of Cisco Systems was  S = $19.06, the expected future
dividend was d = 0%, the risk-free interest rate was r = 5.4% and  the expected future stock
return volatility was Sσ = 34.8%. Cisco uses projected volatility rates, which are based
upon historical volatility rates trended into future years. We wish to value the company’s
                                                
9
 See Business 2.0, The Hidden Cost of Stock Options, David Futrelle, February 01, 2002.
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ESOs using: (i) the Multiple Warrant Valuation Framework (Multiple-WVF) introduced in
this paper, (ii) the standard Single Warrant Valuation Framework (Single-WVF), and (iii)
the Black-Scholes Warrant Valuation Framework (BS-WVF).
(i) The Multiple-WVF: Reproducing a programmable analogue of equation (20),
(combined with assumption 2 of section 4) we have that the valuation formula for a firm
with q Executive Stock Options of maturities qTT << ...1  and of strikes qKK ,...,1  is given,
for any qn ,...,2,1= , by
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To make the formula operational we need to obtain estimates for the value of the firm v
and volatility vσ . To do that we follow the procedure outlined above in section 4, utilizing
the fact that we have information on S and Sσ  (i.e. we solve numerically the simultaneous
equations (33) and (34) using a Newton-Raphson iterative procedure). We obtain the
following values: 32.20$=v  and %2.36=vσ . It’s worth emphasizing that to obtain these
estimates we substituted the Multiple-WVF formula for each )(SWi  (i =1,2,...n,…,q) in
equations (33) and (34).
(ii) The Single-WVF: The Single-WVF constitutes the standard textbook treatment
for the valuation of warrants. In a multiple warrant setting, it takes the following form: for
a firm with q Executive Stock Options of maturities qTT << ...1  and of strikes qKK ,...,1 , we
have that for any qn ,...,2,1=
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10
 mod[x, z] represents modulo division. This returns the value that is the remainder of the integer division of
x by z.
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where the latent parameters v  and vσ  are inferred once again by solving simultaneously
equations (33) and (34). This time however we substitute the Single-WVF formula for
each )(SWi  (i =1,2,...n,…,q). In other words we solve the following system of equations
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We thus obtain: 39.20$=v  and %2.36=vσ .
(iii) The BS-WVF: The Black-Scholes Warrant Valuation Framework (or “option-
like” warrant valuation framework) is popular amongst corporations since it is consistent
with the FASB mandates for accounting for the value/cost of stock-based compensation. It
involves valuing ESOs and warrants as standard call options. Hence the formula for a firm
with q Executive Stock Options of maturities qTT << ...1  and of strikes qKK ,...,1  is simply
given, for any qn ,...,2,1= , by
),,,,()( rKTSCSW SnnBSn σ=
In this case all the parameters involved in the valuation are extractable from the annual
accounts and the financial markets. Cisco states in its annual report that the fair value of
each option grant is estimated on the date of grant using the Black-Scholes option pricing
model. However it acknowledges that because employee stock options have characteristics
significantly different from those of traded options, and because changes in the subjective
input assumptions can materially affect the fair value estimate, the existing models do not
necessarily provide a reliable single measure of the fair value of the Company’s options.
The Multiple-WVF provides the benchmark against which to check the accuracy of
the Single-WVF and the BS-WVF. The latter two, are of course approximations to the
“true” value/cost of ESOs in the presence of multiple-issuances. In Table 2, we report the
values of the company’s ESOs using all three valuation frameworks. We then evaluate the
quality of the Single-WVF and the BS-WVF approximations by reporting the percentage
mispricing error arising from their application. This is calculated as [(Single-WVF –
Multiple-WVF) / Multiple-WVF] and [(BS-WVF - Multiple-WVF) / Multiple-WVF]
respectively.
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TABLE 2
(i) Valuation of Cisco’s ESOs under the Multiple-, Single-, and BS- Warrant Valuation Frameworks and
(ii)Percentage Mispricing Error arising from the use of the Single-WVF and the BS-WVF approximations.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(i) $ Value / Cost (ii) % Mispricing Error
_____________________________________________________________________________________
n = Multiple-WVF Single-WVF BS-WVF of Single-WVF of BS-WVF
------------------ ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
1 =)(1 SW 15.95 =)(1 SW 16.02 =)(1 SW 15.18 0.4% -4.8%
2 =)(2 SW 11.17 =)(2 SW 11.72 =)(2 SW 10.82 4.9% -3.2%
3 =)(3 SW 5.62 =)(3 SW 6.21 =)(3 SW 5.42 10.6% -3.6%
4 =)(4 SW 3.64 =)(4 SW 4.17 =)(4 SW 3.41 14.6% -6.1%
5 =)(5 SW 2.95 =)(5 SW 3.43 =)(5 SW 2.68 16.5% -9.1%
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total =)(SW 6.12 =)(SW 6.12 =)(SW 6.15 N/A 0.5%
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(a) The last row in the table as represented by “Total” gives the $ Value/Cost per ESO when one attempts to
treat the multiple ESOs as a single issuance. It corresponds to the parameter values given in the last row of
table 1.
It is clear from the table that use of the textbook, Single-Warrant Valuation
Framework will result in significant overpricing with the percentage mispricing error
becoming progressively higher as the number of intervening ESO issuances increases.
Indeed the more ESO issuances there are before each particular issuance can be exercised,
the larger the failure to account for the likelihood of dilution of the firm’s equity prior to
exercise of the issuance under consideration. This unavoidably leads to overpricing. In
aggregate now, if the firm erroneously used the Single-WVF (instead of the Multiple-
WVF) to account for the total cost/value of its ESOs it would overestimate their “true”
cost/value by approximately $483.6 million.11 Turning now to the Black-Scholes Warrant
Valuation Framework we observe that its application will also misprice the firm’s ESOs,
but this time in the opposite direction (i.e. this time we observe underpricing of Cisco’s
ESOs). Despite of the fact that the BS-WVF has proved to be an accurate approximation in
single-warrant settings, its performance in a multiple setting is, unfortunately, not nearly as
good (in the case of Cisco, pricing errors ranged from 3.2% to 9.1%). If it were to be used,
the BS-WVF approximation would underestimate the total cost/value of the firm’s options
by approximately $385.5 million.
In the last rows of tables 1 and 2 we have attempted to treat the multiple ESO
issuances of Cisco Systems as a single “representative” ESO issuance (with strike and
maturity given by a weighted average of the individual strikes and maturities respectively)
and value it accordingly. In this case the Multiple-WVF and the Single-WVF coincide and
the values obtained for v and vσ  are $19.94 and 36.3% respectively. The theoretical value
                                                
11
 To arrive at this result simply just subtract the total cost of Cisco’s options arising from the use of the
Multiple-WVF (i.e. (15.95*226 + 11.17*255 + 5.62*338 + 3.64*214 + 2.95*27) = $9,210.5 million) from
the total cost arising from the use of the Single-WVF (i.e.  (16.02*226 + 11.72*255 + 6.21*338 + 4.17*214 +
3.43*27) = $9,694.1 million).
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of this “representative” ESO is then found to be $6.12. Consistent with what has been said
so far, the BS-WVF approximation in this single-warrant setting performs very well,
giving a value of $6.15 per outstanding ESO, a mispricing error of only 0.5%. Attempting
however to assess the total cost/value of the firm’s ESO using this single “representative”
ESO setting is definitely inappropriate. The total cost/value of the company’s ESOs under
this approach amounts to approximately $6.487 billion, an understatement of a staggering
$2.723 billion when compared to their theoretical cost of $9.21 billion arising from the use
of the Multiple Warrant Valuation Framework. (see also footnote 11). Indeed the message
going through from this last exercise is that it is not generally a good idea to approximate
multiple ESO issuances by a representative single issuance, value it accordingly, and
subsequently assess the total cost/value of the company’s options under such a
specification.
6. CONCLUSION
Over the years, interest and more importantly issuance of executive stock options
as a form of stock based compensation has surged. As a result it is now a common
phenomenon for corporations to issue a large number of Executive Stock Options schemes,
each with its own exercise price and maturity. When it comes to valuing corporate
instruments such as executive options and warrants one of the difficulties that immediately
arises is their capital structure effect on the issuing firm. In single-issuance settings this has
never really been a problem since not only there is a well developed theory to account for
the so-called dilution effect but also it has been demonstrated by various studies that
“option-like” valuation results in nearly identical prices for these instruments as the
textbook, value of the firm, approach. However, an investigation on the applicability and
suitability of the current valuation methods in multiple-issuances settings, despite their
increasing popularity, has not so far been performed. In this paper we have extended the
theoretical framework of Galai and Schneller (1978) to account for multiple warrant and
ESO issuances and derived distribution free formulae for firms with warrants and ESOs of
several maturities and strikes. We have illustrated that, when applied in multiple settings,
the textbook, single issuance approach can result in significant overpricing. Likewise we
have also shown that “option-like” valuation is not that good an approximation in multiple
settings and will typically result in underpricing. This re-enforces existing concerns on the
optimality of using standard, unmodified option pricing models to account for the cost of
stock-based compensation. Finally, for the purposes of assessing the total cost of a firm’s
options, the practice of treating multiple issuances as a single representative issuance (with
strike and maturity given by a weighted average of the individual strikes and maturities
respectively) is potentially very dangerous and will produce highly misleading values. In
the example considered in the text, this leads to an “underpricing” of approximately 30%;
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thus underestimating the impact of ESOs on the firm’s value. Likewise, with average
percentage gains or losses of the order of 10% of capital, application of the single warrant
valuation framework or of the Black-Scholes option-like framework can have significant
effects on different groups of shareholders, be they employees or shareholders. The
multiple warrant valuation framework introduced in this paper should be used instead.
7. APPENDIX
Starting from equation (25) we need to arrive to equation (26). We first reproduce equation
(25):
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where C(   ) and P(   ) denote call and put option (pricing functions) respectively. Hence
we have:
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Now using Put-Call parity the above expression simplifies to:
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Some straightforward algebra and we get equation (26):
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